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1 Introduction
Despite the inherently political nature of
international negotiations on climate change,
much of the theory, debate, evidence-gathering
and implementation linking climate change and
development assume a largely apolitical and
linear policy process. As the issue continues to
dominate agendas, it is timely to propose a new
political economy of climate change and
development in which explicit attention is given
to the way that ideas, power and resources are
conceptualised, negotiated and implemented by
different groups at different scales.
Climate change has become one of the defining
contemporary international development issues.
Poverty and human development have been
linked with both the limiting of atmospheric
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations to levels
that avoid dangerous climate change
(‘mitigation’) and the adjustment of human and
natural systems to actual or expected climate
stimuli or their effects (‘adaptation’) (McCarthy
et al. 2001). Recently, the poverty, environment
and development community has been
instrumental in shifting the international focus
from mitigation towards a more balanced
approach that recognises adaptation priorities.
This recognises the pressing underlying need for
mitigation, but also the need for adaptation,
given the realities of coping with prevailing
climate-related impacts and lock-in from historic
emissions to some change, no matter what level
of mitigation is achieved.
Adaptation and development is situated within
existing poverty levels and income inequalities,
with commentators highlighting the unequal
distribution of the impacts of climate change and
the resulting inequity and unfairness given that
poor people globally have contributed least to the
problem (Adger et al. 2006; Kates 2000; Tol et al.
2004; Tanner and Mitchell 2008). At the same
time, with 1.4 billion people still without access to
electricity, the move to low carbon development
pathways has engaged those interested in energy
and poverty, both centralised and decentralised,
as well as other poverty-centred aspects of
mitigation, including forestry and agriculture
(IEA et al. 2010; Nabuurs et al. 2007; Smith et al.
2007). As a result, there has been unprecedented
growth in projects, programmes and policies that
link climate change and development (McGray et
al. 2007; UN-Energy 2010). These have been
driven particularly by United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
processes and international development
agencies.
We argue here that in determining a balance
between effectiveness, efficiency and equity,
climate change initiatives must explicitly
recognise the political economy of their inputs,
processes and outcomes. Political economy is
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defined here as the processes by which ideas,
power and resources are conceptualised,
negotiated and implemented by different groups
at different scales. In applying this definition to
climate change and development, we seek to
broaden the analysis from state-focused
environmental politics to encompass interactions
between the state and non-state actors. This is
more familiar to strands of political ecology
(Bryant and Bailey 1997) but we also seek to
highlight the importance of ideas, ideology and
power in determining these inter-relationships
(Bourdieu 1977; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005).
The articles in this issue of the IDS Bulletin
provide an empirical examination of these
processes, particularly in influencing
international initiatives and their translation
across scales and the way that research and
scientific information are used in the process.
This framing article provides a rationale for
greater understanding of the political economy of
climate change, a suggested conceptual approach,
and a summary of the findings presented in this
IDS Bulletin. In doing so, it provides an evidence
base to support the call for greater attention to
the political economy of climate change.
2 Why do we need a new political economy of
climate change?
The pressing need to consider political economy
dimensions of climate change and development
linkages is founded upon four key issues. First,
the complexity of its political economy is
increased by the cross-sectoral nature of the
issue, with implications across the development
spectrum, from climate-sensitive and emissions-
sensitive sectors to finance and governance.
Second, climate change has been mainly
problematised and tackled as a global issue,
resulting in globally-led governance approaches,
which may not provide sufficient flexibility for
specific national or sub-national conditions.
Third, the expectation and reality of growing
climate change finance changes incentive
structures and rent-seeking behaviours, as well
as raising wider questions about the conceptual
drivers and governance of resource transfer.
Fourth, we argue that a political economy
approach is crucial in unpacking assumptions
about tackling climate change that rely on a
linear apolitical view of the policy process and
tend to frame solutions in technical and
managerial terms. Finally, there are significant
differences in ideological worldviews regarding
responding to climate change that affect
decisions as to how it should be tackled.
The rationale for renewed efforts to understand
the political economy of climate change and
development is based on some of the specific
characteristics of the climate change issue but
also its importance in achieving sustained
poverty reduction outcomes. This is underpinned
by the cross-sectoral nature of the climate
change problem and its solutions: Multiple facets
of development are affected by its impacts, while
reducing emissions cuts across electricity
generation, transportation, domestic and
commercial use, agriculture and industrial
emissions. As a result, our success in tackling the
causes and impacts of climate change will have a
significant bearing on our ability to reduce
poverty sustainably (Stern 2006; UNDP 2007).
Climate change issues do not neatly fit into a
specific sector. This cross-cutting nature of
climate change means that there are frequent
calls to integrate or mainstream the issue across
other areas of development policy and practice
(Reid et al. 2003; OECD 2009). As a result, there
are multiple scales, high diversity and
complexity in its governance, its finance, and its
actors (Rabe 2007). While there is a case for
understanding political economy processes in any
development arena, the interaction of these
facets result in political processes with multiple
and overlapping conceptualisation, negotiation
and governance issues.
As a global problem with a growing international
architecture, climate change debates and
initiatives have tended to be driven from the
global scale. The development of a global
agreement under the UNFCCC to follow the
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol
beyond 2012 has seen a massive stepping up of
political action. For environment and
development activists, this has been
characterised by attention to issues of equity and
global environmental justice in the creation of a
fair international regime that would
simultaneously prevent dangerous climate
change and protect people’s right to move out of
poverty. For those ‘Annex 1’ industrialised
countries, most of whom have emissions targets
under the Kyoto agreement, the focus has been
to ensure that a future regime brings in a wider
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range of countries, particularly those with large
shares in the overall global emissions burden.
Within these contexts, climate change is
presented both as a global crisis that threatens
to derail recent progress in poverty reduction
and as an opportunity to engage and stimulate
the dominant mode of capitalist development
(Oxfam 2009a; GHF 2009; LaFleur et al. 2008;
Newell and Paterson 2010).
Analyses of the political economy of climate
change have tended to focus on either:
z The international politics of climate change
(Dessler and Parson 2006; Luterbacher and
Sprinz 2001), and in particular the different
perception and perspective of the different
governments in the global North and South.
This debate has raised important issues from
an international political economy perspective
around global environmental justice, rights
and compensation (Jamieson 2001; Adger et al.
2006; Roberts and Parks 2007; Okereke
2008a,b).
z The role and business strategy of global
corporate actors in the international politics
and economy of climate change, for example
on the responses of firms in the USA and
European oil and automobile industries to
control emissions of greenhouse gases (Levy
and Kolk 2002); or the positioning of the
financial sector and investors to benefit from
the creation of carbon markets as carbon
traders (such as Eco-securities and Climate
Care), or investors (such as JP Morgan and
Barclays) (Newell and Paterson 2010). These
debates have highlighted from an
international political economy perspective,
the importance of neo-Gramscian approaches
in understanding hegemony, ideology and
power (Levy and Newell 2002).
These strands of analysis, while revealing of the
inherently political nature of international
negotiations and private sector engagement, do
not tackle an important element of the climate
change and development arena, namely the
formulation and translation of international
initiatives to national and sub-national policy
contexts. This is at the core of our suggested new
political economy of climate change and
development, and is increasingly needed given
the emergence and expectation of growing
streams of climate initiatives and finance.
The Cancun Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC in 2010 committed significant sums of
money from industrialised countries to support
adaptation, mitigation and related technology
cooperation in developing countries: US$30
billion in ‘fast start finance’ up to 2012 and the
intention to raise US$100 billion in long-term
funds by 2020. There have been calls,
particularly from developing country
governments at the UNFCCC negotiations for
this money to be committed entirely through the
Convention bodies, and this is reflected in the
decision at Cancun to design a Green Climate
Fund (Bird et al. 2011). However, at least in the
short term, fast start finance will flow through a
range of channels including bilateral and
multilateral official development assistance, the
Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the
UNFCCC, including the Adaptation Fund (see
Harmeling and Kaloga, this IDS Bulletin).
In addition, a growing number of public funds
are already stimulating greater work on climate
change in developing countries, including the
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR),
administered by the World Bank through the
Climate Investment Funds (see Seballos and
Kreft, this IDS Bulletin). The PPCR aims to
create an integrated, scaled-up approach to
climate change adaptation in a number of
(initially eight) participating low-income
countries, preparing them for future adaptation
finance flows such as those emerging from the
UNFCCC processes. In addition, the emerging
schemes around Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) will be
an important stimulus to, and source of funding
for, both adaptation to and mitigation of climate
change (see Hiraldo and Tanner, this IDS
Bulletin). REDD+ schemes also engage with
private sector financial flows, playing a growing
role in the global carbon economy alongside the
Clean Development Mechanism, Joint
Implementation and the voluntary emissions
offset market.
Climate change finance in developing countries
also has the potential to transform traditional
aid modalities. This comes down to differential
interpretations by developing and industrialised
countries of the principle of ‘common but
differentiated responsibilities’ enshrined in the
climate change Convention (Okereke 2008b).
Rather than being based on capability, altruism,
IDS Bulletin Volume 42  Number 3  May 2011 3
charity or political interest, climate change
resource transfers are increasingly framed by
developing countries and campaign organisations
on the basis of equity and ‘climate justice’. In
doing so, they call on industrialised countries not
only for leadership in cutting emissions, but also
for resource transfers on the basis of the
culpability for damages caused and in addition to
existing commitments for official development
assistance (Abdullah et al. 2009; Oxfam 2009b).
The corollary to this argument is that different
governance structures are required for climate
change finance that gives greater control to
developing countries and breaks traditional
donor–recipient relationships.
Despite the slow progress of the UNFCCC
negotiations, the development of financing
mechanisms is characterised by a sense of urgency
and innovation. Both the expectation and
development of these resource flows and their
governance are influenced by competing ideologies
and driven by new incentive structures and
potential for rent capture, both in developing
countries and internationally. These financial flows
and pathways are already changing the nature of
the development arena, yet there remains limited
understanding of the political economy processes
that underpin them. These will be crucial
determinants of the successful creation of low
carbon and climate resilient development, through
private sector flows, new international financing
mechanisms and existing aid flows.
A political economy approach will also help to
unpack technocentric and managerial
approaches to tackling climate change that
regard these processes in apolitical terms. To
date, much of the analysis, policy prescription
and action have centred on assumptions around
standardised governance and planning systems,
linear policy processes, readily transferable
technology, economic rationality, and the ability
of science and technology to overcome resource
gaps (Leach et al. 2010). This has been
particularly pronounced in the climate change
arena because of the dominance of science as a
policy driver, leading to a bias towards
technology-led solutions (Klein et al. 2007).
Taking a political economy approach will
improve understanding of the complexity of
decision-making and policy processes on climate
change, differences in governance and planning
systems, the power relations mediating
competing claims over resources, and the
contextual conditions for enabling the adoption
of technology. As outlined in the next section, the
wide-ranging differences in ideological
worldviews also influence responses to climate
change (Carvalho 2007), with some actors calling
for the commodification of environmental flows
and services as a response, others in favour of
new regulatory regimes, and others focusing on
norms, rights and global environmental justice.
Research and practice therefore needs to go
beyond the dominant political process which
represents climate change as a global problem
requiring global solutions. In particular, greater
attention is required to the translation of global
governance processes to national and sub-
national governance processes. This requires
examination of how climate change initiatives
are conceptualised, negotiated and implemented
at the global level and then reconceptualised,
renegotiated and implemented at the national
and sub-national levels, as well as the interaction
between these levels.
3 A conceptual and analytical framework
There is an increasing number of political
economy tools available, particularly those
formulated by international development
agencies (DFID 2009; European Commission
2008; Sida 2006; World Bank 2004, 2009).
However, we argue that it is necessary to develop
a new conceptual and methodological framework
for analysing the political economy of climate
change. In the development context, political
economy analysis have been applied and
developed at three principal levels (World Bank
2009: 23–4):
z Country-level analysis, which seeks to capture
the overall governance situation and the main
political economy drivers;
z Sector and thematic analysis, which focuses on
specific areas and may cover an entire value
chain;
z Problem-driven analysis, which focuses on
specific projects and/or policy decisions.
Recent guidance from DFID on political
economy analysis recognised the need to
understand the impact of regional or global
drivers on domestic change processes given the
increasingly interdependent nature of the
current global system (DFID 2009).
Tanner and Allouche Towards a New Political Economy of Climate Change and Development4
Nevertheless, current tools for political economy
analysis do not integrate these global dynamics,
which makes it difficult to understand how
political institutions, the political environment,
and the economic system interact at the national
level. The specific institutional architecture
underpinning climate change and development
internationally and nationally should therefore
be the focus of political economy analysis for
climate change and development. This overview
article focuses on recommendations for those
developing and implementing climate change
initiatives and future research priorities.
We develop here a new political economy
approach that analyses policy processes and
outcomes in terms of ideas, power and resources
to frame the articles in this IDS Bulletin. This
goes beyond dominant approaches to analysis of
climate change initiatives, as highlighted in
Table 1. This includes the model of the policy
process, attention to scalar issues beyond the
global, the social construction of science and
importance of driving narratives, a focus on
processes mediating resource distributions and
the inclusion of power and ideology.
We seek to go beyond orthodox international
political economy analyses, which have been
limited to material factors and have ignored how
ideas and ideologies also determine policy
outcomes (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). These
ideological framings often become part of
narratives that are supported by particular
actors, networks and institutions and justify a
particular set of actions (Leach et al. 2010). For
example, Clapp and Dauvergne (2005) define
broad sets of environmental ideologies as: the
market liberals, who ‘underscore the benefits
and dynamics of free trade and technology’, the
institutionalists, who ‘emphasize the need for
stronger global institutions and norms’, the
bioenvironmentalists, who ‘stress the limits of
earth to support life’ and social greens who ‘see
social and political problems as inseparable’.
These different worldviews enable us to provide a
link between different levels of analysis at the
global, national and local level. Although
idealised views, these provide important
analytical tools in understanding convergences,
coalitions and divergences in the global and
national political economy of climate change.
Our assumption is that market liberalism will be
the most powerful ideology in terms of structural
power. As highlighted by Bernstein (2001) and
Okereke (2008a) among others, global
environmental governance is dominated by the
‘liberal environmentalism compromise’, as
embedded in the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and its
corollaries. This refers to the way in which the
concept of sustainability was transformed into a
set of technical understandings that purged it of
its radical elements so as to do as little harm as
possible to orthodox ideas of economic
development.
The major difficulty is to provide an analytical
distinction between ideas and interests as
determinants of policy (Campbell 1998) and our
focus will be on the intersection between ideas
and power. There is a strong correlation between
the concept of power and ideas. Power can in
some instances be used as an all encompassing
concept, which includes ideas and ideologies. As
Bourdieu (1977: 165) noted:
The theory of knowledge is a dimension of
political theory because the specifically symbolic
power to impose the principles of the
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Table 1 A new political economy analysis to inform climate change and development initiatives
Issue Dominant approach New political economy
Policy process Linear, informed by evidence Complex, informed by ideology, actors and power relations
Dominant scale Global and inter-state Translation of international to national and sub-national level
Climate change science Role of objective science in Social construction of science and driving narratives
and research informing policy
Scarcity and poverty Distributional outcomes Political processes mediating competing claims for resources
Decision-making Collective action, rational Ideological drivers and incentives, power relations
choice and rent seeking
construction of reality – in particular, social
reality – is a major dimension of political power.
Power can be seen as both relational and
structural (relational being the ability of actors to
compel others to change their policies, while
structural power refers to authority, or ‘power
over’ outcomes in global frameworks of security,
finance, production and knowledge relationships).
Strange (1988) argues that it is the less visible
structural power, informing the agenda that
needs to be examined for a meaningful analysis
of the international political economy.
Many of the articles in this IDS Bulletin suggest a
disconnect between international initiatives,
national implementation processes and the space
for public consultation. This disconnect is usually
analysed as a governance gap, essentially the
failure of national agencies to implement
programmes due to the lack of technical capacity,
resource constraints or political will (Cammack
2007). Instead, we argue that one should expect
the implementation outcomes at the national level
to be differentiated, since the national space
reflects an additional layer of renegotiation.
Responses to climate change need to be
understood through a political economy
framework that takes into account ideas and
ideology and different scales. Previous governance
analyses have focused largely on institutions,
power and capacity building, rather than political
ideological processes embedded in the governance
of climate change and development (Béland 2009).
Most global governance analyses have described
global processes as a collective action solution
emerging out of a shared concern for improved
governance of common goods (in our case,
climate change). These previous analyses ignore
the different aspects of power in negotiation
processes, namely imposition, domination,
structural determination or cultural hegemony
(on the failure to integrate power in global
governance analysis, see Barnett and Duvall
2005). Our conceptual framework of the political
economy of climate change and development is
represented in Figure 1.
This is an analytical framework that distinguishes
between different elements in the policy process.
Our framework of analysis breaks the political
economy of climate change into six sets of
analytical areas involving the conceptualisation,
negotiation and implementation of climate
change initiatives at both international and
national levels. It explicitly recognises the in-
phases between international and national
implementation. The programmes are translated
and debated at the national level, providing
spaces for negotiation and interpretation
between civil society, NGOs, private actors, and
the different ministries in government. While
there are many examples of bottom-up
initiatives, especially around community-based
adaptation and decentralised energy, this
framework emphasises the primacy of global
politics in policymaking in the political economy
of climate change and development.
While providing an analytical starting point, two
major issues should be recognised. First, this
framework does not represent a linear transition
from conceptualisation to implementation
(Keeley and Scoones 2003). Rather, it provides an
analytical framework to deconstruct the policy
dynamics around conceptualisation, negotiation
and implementation. Second, the boundaries
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework for the political economy of climate change and development
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between the international and national dynamics
are permeable, representing the fluidity between
these different levels. National dynamics are often
key influences on international processes and vice
versa. For example, writing on the REDD agenda
in Brazil, Shankland and Hasenclever (this IDS
Bulletin) show how preparation for global forums
and events provided a powerful driver for
domestic negotiation with political parties, NGOs
and civil society organisations.
Across these analytical areas, the framework
analyses the interplay between the three lenses
of ideas, power and resources in the political
economy of climate change and development.
While the boundaries between these three lenses
are blurred, our hypothesis is that each of these
concepts tends to be predominant at one stage of
the policy process of the political economy of
climate change. Ideas and ideologies are
predominant in the conceptualisation phase,
power in the negotiation phase and resources,
institutional capacity and governance in the
implementation phase.
4 Contributions of a new political economy of
climate change and development
The conceptual framework presented above helps
to break down different dimensions of political
economy and tools for their analysis around
climate change and development. The articles in
this IDS Bulletin provide examples of how
elements of these concepts can be used to capture
and frame knowledge in case-specific contexts.
These are organised around three themes. The
first four articles (summarised here in section 4.1)
analyse the political economy elements of
international climate change and development
policy processes and initiatives. Five further
articles then reflect on the translation of these
processes at the national and sub-national level
and examine how international climate change
initiatives processes are transformed through new
conceptualisations and renegotiation
(summarised here in section 4.2). The last three
articles (summarised here in section 4.3) seek to
understand and inform policy spaces for change
by looking at how research inputs and stakeholder
engagement can inform policy processes around
climate change and development.
4.1 International initiatives
To date, there has been significant analytical
attention to climate change at the international
level, predominantly on aspects of the UNFCCC
negotiations and inter-state politics (see, e.g.
Luterbacher and Sprinz 2001; Yamin and
Depledge 2004; Roberts and Parks 2007; Park et al.
2008). The first set of articles in this IDS Bulletin
examines the political economy of international
climate change and development initiatives.
These stem both directly from the UNFCCC, as
in the case of the Adaptation Fund and REDD,
and indirectly, such as the World Bank’s Pilot
Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) and
broader global carbon market. These articles
reveal the way that international initiatives are
determined not by objective scientific evidence
but by the dynamics of ideas, interests and power
relations at play across different actors in
international processes. They also raise important
issues for the future of international climate
initiatives, particularly the development of the
Green Climate Fund agreed in Cancun in 2010.
Richard Klein and Annett Möhner provide a
critique of the idea that objective science can lead
decision-making on climate change finance. They
trace the history and contemporary debates
around defining which countries should be
prioritised based on their vulnerability to climate
change impacts. Analysis of the Global Climate
Change Alliance, the PPCR and the Adaptation
Fund reveals that vulnerability and prioritisation
are inconsistent. The determination of
vulnerability varies from one scheme to another
and is both politically and scientifically ambiguous,
reflecting ‘ontologically localised’ science that is
specific to types of phenomena and its location
(Aronson et al. 1994: 153). This supports a broader
conclusion reflected across this IDS Bulletin and in
the wider literature, around the institutional
nature and sociopolitical construction of science
linking climate change and development (Dessler
and Parson 2006; Schneider 2010).
The political economy of the Adaptation Fund
under the UNFCCC is further examined by Sven
Harmeling and Alpha Kaloga in their article. The
Adaptation Fund is innovative in a number of
ways. It operates under the authority of the
UNFCCC country Parties and unlike other
UNFCCC funds, its resources are not based on
voluntary donation. Instead, they are generated
from a levy on the proceeds of transactions made
under the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), under which industrialised countries can
meet part of their Kyoto Protocol targets through
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emission reduction projects in developing
countries. Governance of the fund by the
Adaptation Fund Board differs from other donor-
driven funds in its transparency and majority
developing country membership. This structure
also allows for implementation via direct access
of funds rather than through a UN implementing
agency.
The negotiation of the Fund’s operating
modalities reflects the international institutional
competition familiar to other climate change
initiatives, particularly around the respective
roles of the Global Environment Facility (GEF)
and the World Bank. The creation of a separate
governance structure was justified by developing
countries by the special nature of the Fund itself.
Despite this, the Adaptation Fund remains
poorly financed, given its scope. The authors
suggest that this is due to it being a new
modality, through a new set of environmental
institutions, and designed to stand alone from
voluntary contributions. The environment
ministry and project-based Adaptation Fund
implementation process also runs counter to the
ideological narrative popular with international
development donor agencies. This promotes
mainstreaming by embedding adaptation in
government development planning processes and
encouraging a ministry with a broad mandate,
such as planning or finance, to be fully involved
(AfDB et al. 2003: XI).
This mainstreaming narrative is examined by Fran
Seballos and Sönke Kreft’s article on the
formulation and governance of the World Bank’s
PPCR. The article provides a framing analysis
within which subsequent country case studies on
Mozambique, Nepal and Bangladesh contained in
this IDS Bulletin can be situated. They suggest that
the programme combines the validation and
reinforcement of this ideology with the sense of
urgency in implementing adaptation measures and
the positioning of the World Bank Group and
multilateral development banks on the climate
finance stage. In using the structures of
international financing institutions as
implementing agencies especially by bringing loan-
based finance into the picture, this fund challenges
many principles of the UNFCCC process.
The presence of competing ideologies and
narratives are also important components of the
process of negotiating international architecture
and norms around REDD+. Rocío Hiraldo and
Thomas Tanner’s examination of different
ideological worldviews frames the proposals,
issues and negotiation around reducing
emissions from deforestation, reforestation and
land degradation. The dominant market-liberal
ideology that frames proposals around market
mechanisms is linked to Annexe I country
concerns about the need to find low-cost REDD+
funding modalities, while international
institutional competition can also be witnessed
in the support to different proposed regimes.
They also critique the voice of forest-dwelling
indigenous movements within the REDD+
negotiations, arguing that the invited spaces
open to observer groups under the UNFCCC are
created by more powerful actors in order to
increase the legitimacy of their proposals.
The issue of power and inclusion within the
processes of negotiating and implementing
climate change and development initiatives is
reflected across all of the articles in this IDS
Bulletin. Besides simple attempts to capture the
emerging rents from these initiatives, three
inter-related causal factors can be distinguished. 
First, the sense of urgency to plan, develop and
implement initiatives provides a disincentive to
more complex and inclusive processes of dialogue
and negotiation. As discussed further below, one
consequence is that more powerful voices are
readily able to articulate a strong framing
narrative or set of narratives to which others are
only able to make incremental changes. For the
PPCR for example, one result has been the
exclusion of civil society, national governments
and other donors, from the processes determining
where and how the finance is implemented, and
who manages that implementation.
Second, the existing channels for accountability
and inclusion are often more issue or sector
driven, while climate change initiatives cut across
multiple sectors and issues, particularly in the
divide between adaptation and mitigation
approaches. Peter Newell et al.’s article notes that
despite this overlap, the renewable energy sector
in India has benefited from its strategic
management being designated to a single
Ministry, avoiding some of the common
governance problems of overlapping functions
and duplicated mandates across government.
Finally, the predominant vision of tackling
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climate change through international institutions
and national governments necessarily limits the
opportunity for broader engagement. We argue
that is not only because they are underpinned by
the inter-governmental process of the UNFCCC
but also due to the dominance of an ideological
framing around mainstreaming of climate change
into development processes that focuses attention
more on links within government and less with
those outside. Equally, the process of
internationalising climate change initiatives and
the consequent concentration of climate finance
delivery in structures outside the country
architecture may retain power in spaces beyond
the influence of the country government and civil
society actors, as noted by Seballos and Kreft in
their article on the PPCR.
4.2 Translating international initiatives across
scales
As illustrated in Figure 1, our conceptual
framework calls for greater attention to the
translation of international initiatives through
policy processes at national and sub-national
scales. This IDS Bulletin identifies a number of
cross-cutting themes on this translation process
that deserve further attention to improve
understanding of the political economy of
climate change and development.
The first theme concerns the relationship
between the global and the national level. As in
debates around development assistance, the
question of ownership at the national level
remains an important point of contention. This is
illustrated by the dispute described in the article
by Alam et al. between the Government of
Bangladesh and international donors over the role
of the World Bank in managing climate change
trust funds. Support to the government position
from the country’s media and international NGO
campaigners was chiefly over the principle of
climate change funding being distinct from
development cooperation, based on responsibility
not charity. Shankland and Chambote’s article on
Mozambique provides another illustration on how
international climate change initiatives are still
largely top-down processes, characterised by
contestation of an imposed agenda by the World
Bank Group institutions rather than inclusion
within processes of planning those initiatives.
Examining India’s clean energy sector, the Newell
et al. article shows how both the perception and
reality of a positive international investment
climate means the Indian state is well placed to
lever the private capital required to fund a low
carbon energy transition.
The role of internationally renowned expertise in
national processes also raises questions about
country ownership and policy choices and
preferences. Such actors blur the global–national
divide, sometimes playing crucial roles in
shaping agendas and priorities at both scales
(Edwards and Miller 2001; Bäckstrand 2003). As
the cases in Brazil and Bangladesh demonstrate,
these countries have themselves been very
important in shaping the international agenda.
The relationship also cannot be limited to an
understanding of a top-down process, since the
ambiguity surrounding concepts such as
adaptation, mitigation and resilience has led to
different interpretations and outcomes in various
countries. The confusion between these concepts
is well illustrated in the Nepal case study by
Ayers et al., where various stakeholders hold
different interpretations and definitions
according to their own political interest.
The second important line of enquiry in the
political economy of climate change and
development focuses on the link between power
and ideologies. While a variety of ideologies and
environmental worldviews have been identified by
the different authors in this IDS Bulletin (see, e.g.
Shankland and Hasenclever’s definition of a
sociocultural perspective by indigenous groups in
Brazil), there is often a lack of clear leadership and
significant levels of contestation on climate change
issues. In many countries, it is unclear at the
government level who is and should be responsible,
whether the Ministry of Environment or the
Ministry of Planning, with limited interest and
involvement of the political parties (see, e.g. the
article on Bangladesh by Alam et al.). The same
issue dominates civil society organisations, which
are often fragmented according to specific sectoral
interests and issues. One can observe a crisis of
leadership and vision in the environmental sector.
Third, institutional dynamics are often explained
by path dependency rather than by clear
leadership, ideologies and visions. In Mozambique,
climate change policy is understood through the
lens of disaster risk reduction and as a
continuation of this paradigm. In Bangladesh,
climate change has been interpreted as part of
environmental management, with leadership on
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the national climate change plan, its finance and
the PPCR process all directed through the
Ministry of Environment and Forests.
However, the most striking feature in this IDS
Bulletin on the political economy of climate
change and development, is the sense of urgency
that has dominated the national policy process in
all the countries examined. This has resulted in
issues around coordination with other initiatives,
the level of participation, and time horizons.
This sense of urgency can be explained due to
the global discourse urging leaders to act quickly
to provide policies to adapt and mitigate climate
change, but also the growing association between
disaster events with climate change. Articles
here suggest that commonly rushed schedules for
implementation, whether in Bangladesh, Brazil
or Mozambique for example, did not foster the
basis for a strong level of participation from
across government, NGO and civil society. The
responses by civil society organisations have also
been slow in part due to sectoral divisions and
the difficulty of voicing a unified message.
This urgency may also influence design criteria
for initiatives, pushing them towards areas and
interventions where they easily demonstrate
short-term impact. We believe therefore that
programmes such as the PPCR are therefore
likely to channel money to areas where the
additional element of ‘climate proofing’ is most
readily discernible, perhaps favouring
technological add-ons, rather than addressing
the contextual factors related to development
that determine vulnerability to climate change
impacts. This in turn may limit the potential for
any transformational changes as a result.
4.3 Understanding and informing policy spaces for
change
The final set of articles brings the discussion
back to the issue of how research inputs can
inform policy processes around climate change
and development. In investigating links between
policy-focused and action researchers in climate
adaptation, they examine the potential for action
research to understand and explicitly link with
relevant policy processes and spaces. Lars Otto
Naess et al. provide an overview of this work,
echoing our call for going beyond conventional
governance analysis to incorporate wider
influences on policy processes, including
ideologies and narratives.
Working with participatory action research
projects under the Climate Change Adaptation
in Africa (CCAA) programme, they outline an
analytical framework adapted from on research
on environmental policy processes in Africa and
on policy spaces in power analysis (Keeley and
Scoones 2003; Gaventa 2006). This combines
analysis of narratives and evidence, actors and
networks, and politics and interests to study the
different potential spaces and means for
research to influence policy. In designing and
informing adaptation initiatives, they call for
greater attention to understanding the processes
through which different policy pathways are
chosen and implemented.
The importance of narratives in driving policy
agendas is critical to the case studies presented.
Narratives are storylines that help identify
competing ways of viewing a particular policy
problem. Broad narratives around climate change
include one which suggests that climate change
is a grave threat to humankind. An alternative
narrative is that climate change presents
opportunities for improving human wellbeing.
Blessings Chinsinga et al.’s investigation into a
crop diversification initiative in Malawi exposed
conflicting government policies that undermine
the potential contribution that such a project can
make to adaptation. Dominant narratives
equating food security with maize sufficiency at
household and national level frustrated the
ability of the research to demonstrate the value
of crop diversification to policymakers. Although
it underlies much of government agriculture
policy, crop diversification is limited, as there are
few mechanisms to ensure alternative crops are
available for farmers. This narrative is
strengthened by strongly ingrained perceptions
of Malawians of alternative crops as ‘inferior
food’. The researchers find the ‘crop
diversification for adaptation’ narrative to be
much weaker, despite the investments in related
research, and interventions such as the fertiliser
subsidy programme.
Guthiga and Newsham’s contribution reinforces
the importance of strong narratives at national
and sub-national scales. They argue that these
narratives weaken the potential for indigenous
knowledge (IK) to enter mainstream debates on
adaptation and to be adequately represented in
policy fora, despite growing international
acceptance of the value of IK for adaptation
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(Tschakert 2007). Climate change as a futuristic
concern may add to perception of indigenous
practices as outdated and unreliable, and the
validity of IK in general requires greater
recognition at the national level before IK
research can have significant influence. Their
case study shows that although discrete
observations from IK are increasingly
recognised, this does not extend to the wider
management systems, institutions and
worldviews in which IK is embedded. This is of
key importance to the knowledge systems’
continued use in a changing climate.
Understanding the political economy of the policy
process is important not only to improve policy
impact of research but also because it can help to
understand the dynamics and characteristics
underpinning adaptive capacity and resilience.
This in turn helps to determine what processes
promote more robust and resilient societies in
line with broader development challenges (Adger
et al. 2007). By identifying policy spaces, the
authors in this section argue that political
economy analyses can be key considerations for
improved success in policy engagement for
adaptation research. This may include working
with relevant actors and networks, understanding
their interests and examining how research fits
with dominant narratives. In some cases, this
may mean challenging narratives and ‘tinkering
around the edges’ to influence policies. However,
this is not likely to be sufficient for the research
evidence to have an impact on policies.
5 A future agenda to challenge linear policy
models and apolitical initiatives
In summary, the growing importance of climate
change in the development arena and the
frequent assumption of linear policymaking and
apolitical, techno-managerial solutions make the
development of a new political economy
emphasis vital to determining efficient,
equitable and effective responses. Drawing on
the articles in this IDS Bulletin, we suggest that
explicit attention is given to the way that ideas,
power and resources are conceptualised,
negotiated and implemented by different groups
at different scales. In particular, this is needed in
the formulation of international initiatives and
their translation to national and sub-national
policy contexts. At the same time, there is a
pressing need to better understand the role of
academic and scientific research and data in
these processes. An awareness of these
underlying processes will help the wide range of
people with a stake in climate and development
futures to negotiate and implement changes that
learn from mistakes and build on successes.
The political economy of climate change and
development urgently needs further attention
and research, particularly as financial flows for
climate change and development are only
recently beginning to have significance at
national level. We have identified two important
avenues for future research. First, the question
of the perception of donors by recipient countries
is clearly an important research area. In this IDS
Bulletin, we have seen that most interventions
are still designed through a donor–recipient
relationship. These relationships ignore two
major issues that are particularly relevant to
climate change debates: (1) climate change
programmes on mitigation and adaptation are
part of a larger global political process which
recognise responsibilities and rights and global
justice around climate change issues, and (2) the
beneficiaries of these interventions may be wider
than the host country, extending to the global
community. Further research therefore needs to
examine more precisely to what extent are
donor–recipient relationships changing in terms
of design and implementation of climate change
and development programmes? Second, as most
of these international initiatives and
programmes are at their early phases, it was too
early to examine issues related to governance
and institutional capacity, especially at the
national level. Additional research is needed on
the relationship between ideologies, power and
resources to understand to what extent policy
practices will be effective depending on the
congruence between ideas and ideologies and
power configurations. This includes
understanding how the operationalisation of
policy practices for climate change mirrors
particular governance models (regulatory or
market-based) that reflect particular dominant
interests and ideas.
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